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FREE PRESS-FAIR TRIAL: REVIEW OF SILENCE
ORDERS
DOUGLAS RENDLEMANt
Free press-fair trial stands at the intersection of the first amend-
ment and criminal procedure. The substantive problems of reconciling
the incongruous constitutional interests create a "civil libertarian's
nightmare."' Those who would disclose public business to the public are
normally protected from state interference. The rights of the media to
publish and the public to receive full reports of criminal proceedings
may, however, encroach upon the rights of the litigants. The media may
express opinions, reach conclusions and publish facts which are inadmis-
sible at trial or which stir group hostilities. When this occurs, a fair trial
may be difficult or impossible since a jury or potential jury may have
been improperly influenced. Thus some limit on disseminating informa-
tion about criminal trials is considered necessary.
Although the problem is far from new, a fresh impetus to examine
free press-fair trial questions has been generated by Supreme Court
decisions reversing criminal convictions because of presumed media
influences.' Generally, defendants will seek to limit publicity, but occa-
sionally they may want to bring alleged injustices to the attention of the
public in order to promote a particular cause or to finance their de-
fense. 3 On the other hand, the state seeking a conviction that will stand
on appeal, rarely desires publicity4 and oftens attempts to limit it.5 The
media's interest is straightforward. It argues that the public has a right
to be informed of public business and states that "the rules of evidence
tJ.D. University of Iowa, L.L.M. University of Michigan, Assistant Professor of Law,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary. The author notes his appreciation
for aid from Peggy Horton, librarian, and George Harris and Bob Wiggins, research assistants.
'Hentoff, Civil Libertarian's Nightmare: Free Press Fair Trial, CIVIL LIBERTIEs, Feb. 1973,
at 4.
2Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
'See Hamilton v. Municipal Court, 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1969); Warren
& Abell, Free Press-Fair Trial: The "Gag Order," A California Aberration, 45 S. CAL. L. REv.
51, 84-85 (1972).
'See the prosecutor's interesting predicament in Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 152-
53, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 234-35 (1973) (discussed note 181 infra).
'In Sun Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1973), the state asked
for an order to prevent the newspapers from publishing the names of witnesses. Since the witnesses
were prisoners, the prosecution asserted that, if names were published, the witnesses would be
subject to retaliation.
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have no relevance whatever to the right of the public to know about the
administration of criminal justice."' The judiciary possesses several
methods or techniques to resolve these conflicts and to accommodate
the rights of the press and the public with those of the defendant and
the state: continuance of the trial, change of venue, care in selecting the
jury, sequestering the jury after it is selected, use of a silence order to
control the sources of publicity,7 and finally, sanctions against those who
release or publish proscribed information.
The problem to be described and analyzed in this article is how to
obtain appellate review of a silence order issued in a criminal proceed-
ing. Primary attention will be focused upon the media. This article will
examine the media's procedural routes from the criminal action into an
appellate court: terminal review, interlocutory review, review by prerog-
ative writ and review of contempt. Several aspects of silence order
review will be before the reader almost continually. These are questions
about the party status of the media, the uncertain legal nature of the
order, and the lack of time for full dress review. They will be mentioned
when relevant and discussed when appropriate. Differing and even in-
consistent conclusions will be drawn about each as the article prog-
resses. The practical and conceptual procedural problems are important
and merit study for their own sake. In addition, some generalizations
will emerge concerning the relations between procedural alternatives
and the development of substantive law.
TERMINAL REVIEW
Normally federal and many state appellate courts wait until a law-
suit is completed before reviewing the rulings of a lower court under
what is termed the final decision requirement.' Because the prosecution
rarely takes an appeal, most criminal appeals are taken by the
defendant. A defendant's appeal, however, provides an impossible
forum for the media to obtain review of a silence order. The convicted
defendant may be asserting in favor of reversal that excessive publicity
deprived him of a fair trial.1 Furthermore, the appellate court will be
'Warren & Abell, supra note 3, at 81.
'The term "silence order" is used in preference to "gag order" which is perjorative, Younger
v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 143 n.l, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 228 n.l (1973), and "protective order"
which means something else, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
928 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970); IoWA R. Civ. P. 331.
9Cf. Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1970).
"Cf. Judge Frossell dissenting in United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 94-95, 123
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urged to hold that the defendant did not have a fair trial because the
silence order was not protective enough. The media are not parties to
either the trial or the appeal. Nevertheless, they could participate in an
appeal from a conviction as amicus curiae. An amicus posture is, how-
ever, irregular and incongruous. The media would direct its efforts
against the order rather thcn the conviction and presumably would
argue for its affirmance. In addition, since the trial has ended, the issue
of the validity of the silence order becomes moot. Moreover, if the
silence order were obeyed, review of the order in defendant's appeal
from the sentence will be rare because of the lack of prejudicial public-
ity.
Silence orders may arguably fall under the federal collateral order-
practical finality doctrine. This doctrine allows appeals from interlocu-
tory rulings which produce a substantial impact on litigants, are tangen-
tial to the merits and will either be moot on terminal review or not
merged in the final judgment." Because of the "final" impact of these
orders, they are termed final decisions. 2 Silence orders meet several of
the requirements for appealability under this doctrine. The order, as it
relates to the media, will not be merged in the final judgment, 3 nor
does it relate to the ultimate issue, the guilt or innocence of the defen-
dant. The media's interest will rarely, if ever, be asserted on terminal
review. If the media obeys the silence order, the order will have achieved
its purpose before terminal review can be secured, and the question will
be moot on terminal appeal. 4 Finally, an order limiting publication is
a prior restraint and, if erroneous, attenuates the basic constitutional
right of the media to publish. 5 If no effective review is provided, consti-
tutional error may be uncorrected.
N.E.2d 777, 789 (1954).
"See, e.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964); Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 756-57 (8th Cir. 1971);
Carter Products, Inc. v. Eversharp, Inc., 360 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1966); Staggers v. Otto Gerdau
Co., 359 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1966).
2C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 455-58 (2d ed. 1970).
13Cf. Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1970).
"Cf. Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 282 N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972).
"United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496,499-501 (5th Cir. 1972); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 259, 418 P.2d 594, 596 (1966); State ex rel. Miami Herald v.
Rose, 271 So. 2d 483 (Fla. App. 1972); State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69,
75-76, 483 P.2d 608, 612, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). See also In re Oliver, 452 F.2d I11,
114-15 (7th Cir. 1971). Concerning prior restraints, see generally New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 503-12 (1970).
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However, difficulties arise in applying the collateral order doctrine
to silence orders. Appeals in criminal cases before final judgment are
rare."6 Additionally, the representatives of the media are not parties to
the criminal case. 17 Even if review were granted, a practical remedy
might not be forthcoming. Unless the appeal from the silence order
stays or continues the criminal proceeding or the silence order itself was
stayed, the criminal case would proceed to verdict and perhaps moot the
issues in the appeal.' 8 Thus the media could be effectively stilled during
the pendency of an appeal and, because cold news is dead news, be the
practical losers in an appeal which upholds their right to publish."9
INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW
Review of final and collateral orders is by right. Many procedural
systems provide for discretionary interlocutory review before a final
decision under certain specified conditions. In the federal system, an
appeal may be allowed from an interlocutory order if the district judge
certifies the need for an appeal and the court of appeals accepts the
appeal. 2° The standard is imposing: the district judge must certify that
the interlocutory order concerns "a controlling question of law as to
which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion,"'2 and that
"an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ulti-
mate termination of the litigation. 2 2 If the appeal is granted by the
court of appeals, proceedings in the district court are not halted pending
a decision on the appeal unless the district judge or a judge of the court
of appeals orders a stay.2?
This means of appeal may have value in some cases,24 but it pro-
vides little aid in attaining relief from a silence order. First, it only
"ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
CRIMINAL APPEALS 28-40 (Approved Draft 1970).
"United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 508 (5th Cir. 1972); State ex rel. Superior Court,
79 Wash. 2d 69, 78-79, 483 P.2d 608, 614, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971) (Rosellini, J.,
concurring). They are parties to the extent that the public's interest is represented by the public
prosecutor.
18Cf. Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 282 N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972) (Article 78
proceeding dismissed as moot).
"Warren & Abell, supra note 3, at 62, 87-88.
-28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 462-64.
2128 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
221d.
231d.
21Carrington, Power of District Judges and the Responsibility of Courts ofAppeals, 3 GA. L.
REv. 507, 510 (1969).
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applies to "civil" actions.25 While a silence order may seem "civil"
because it does not relate to the criminal defendant, the underlying
action is criminal. Interpreted most favorably, a silence order is merely
a civil order in a criminal case, enforceable by criminal contempt. Sec-
ondly, while there may be "substantial ground for difference of opinion"
about legal validity of the oiler, the order does not control the rights
of the state or the defendant who are the parties to the criminal action.
The defendant might consider himself aggrieved by the lack of a silence
order or by one that is not sufficiently restrictive, but these situations
would not likely concern the media. Thirdly, an appeal from a silence
order presumably could not "materially advance the ultimate termina-
tion" of the criminal trial. Finally, both the trial and appellate courts
must exercise their discretion to grant the appeal.
Some states have less restrictive methods of discretionary
interlocutory review. In Iowa, for example, "any party aggrieved" by
an interlocutory order "may apply to the Supreme Court. . .to grant
an appeal in advance of final judgment."26 The supreme court must find
that the interlocutory order "involves substantial rights and will materi-
ally affect the final decision"2 7 and that an immediate appeal "will better
serve the interests of justice. ' 28 The order granting an interlocutory
appeal halts proceedings in the trial court, 29 and filing dates may be
advanced in order to accelerate submission and decision." A rule simi-
lar to Iowa's is, for the media, an improvement over the federal statute.
However, difficulties in the Iowa-type rule compromise its usefulness.
First, although the rule is not limited to civil actions, only a party can
petition for an interlocutory appeal. The media may, in some sense, be
parties to the order, but they are not formal parties to the underlying
lawsuit. Secondly, although only one level of discretion is imposed be-
fore an appeal is heard, discretion exists, nevertheless, and appeal does
not lie as of right. Finally, an appeal by the media from a silence order
will normally not affect the final decision in the criminal case. Thus
under the federal statute and the somewhat more liberal Iowa rule, a
discretionary interlocutory appeal is not a satisfactory avenue to re-
-28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
"
6IoWA R. Cv. P. 332.
27d.
"Id.
NlOWA R. Civ. P. 332(b).
Id.
1973]
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view a silence order. Interlocutory appeal rules in other jurisdictions
reveal similar difficulties .3
APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION
Appeal by right is available in the federal system3" and many state
systems 3 from orders granting or denying certain interlocutory in-
junctions. Several of the difficulties encountered above are obviated if
a silence order can be denominated an appealable preliminary injunc-
tion. In general, although a mere order is not appealable, an injunction
is,31 and although a temporary restraining order is not appealable, a
preliminary injunction is.35 The courts without much apparent thought
have labelled silence orders both injunctions and orders.36 Silence or-
ders might appear to be injunctions since those with knowledge of the
order are bound to refrain from performing a prohibited act, and viola-
tors are subject to contempt.37 On the other hand, Moore states that
"an order incidental to a pending action that does not grant part or all
of the ultimate injunctive relief sought is not an injunction, however
mandatory or prohibitory its terms, and indeed, notwithstanding the
fact that it purports to enjoin."3 Since the silence order is ancillary to
the sentence, under Moore's analysis, the order is not appealable as an
injunction.
In distinguishing non-appealable restraining orders from appeala-
ble interlocutory injunctions, courts have stressed the order's purpose,
31See, e.g., 32 FLA. App. R. 4.2 (civil cases, listing classes of appealable orders).
3228 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970); C. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 459-61.
3E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1201(F)(2).
3 1Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955); 9 J. MOORE, MooRE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 110.20 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
"Smith v. Jackson State College, 441 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Annot., 19
A.L.R.3d 403 (1968); Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 459 (1968). But see Financial Serv. Inc. v. Ferrandina,
474 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1973).
"
8An order is a generic term which includes any judicial conclusion granting or denying relief.
An injunction is more specifically an order directing those bound to do or refrain from doing
certain specified acts. Thus, all injunctions are also orders and to call an act by the court an order
does not mean that it is not an injunction. The silence order cases are United States v. Dickinson,
465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972) (id. at 499, protective order), (id. at 500, order), (id. at 506, special
orders), (id. at 508, injunction); Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1973)
(id. at 143 n.1, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 228 n.1, protective order), (Id. at 158, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 239, not
civil judgments granting injunctions); State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 483
P.2d 608, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971) (order throughout).
"United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 512 (5th Cir. 1972).
39 MOORE U 1 10.20[1], at 233.
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duration and procedural background. 9 If the purpose of the order is
to preserve the status quo until a more rigorous proceeding can be held,
the order is generally considered a restraining order and not appeala-
ble. 0 If, on the other hand, the merits of the case are decided or substan-
tial rights affected and a later proceeding is not contemplated, the order
is appealable as a preliminery injunction.41 Thus under the purpose
criteria, silence orders appear to be appealable because they affect sub-
stantial rights and do not lay the foundation for a later, more rigorous
proceeding.
Appealability is frequently denied to orders of short duration and
granted to those of indefinite or lengthy duration.12 Silence orders range
from indefinite duration43 to definite but lengthy duration44 to merely
overnight. 5 Those which limit publicity until the end of the trial or until
further order of court might, because of the time involved, be appealable
under this criteria. However, the length of time does not, because of the
other interests at issue, provide a crucial basis to distinguish appealable
from nonappealable silence orders.
Frequently appealability is denied if an order is issued without
notice and a hearing for the defendant46 but granted if the order is issued
following an adversary proceeding.4 7 This variable seems more applica-
ble to the cases for which it was formulated, two party litigation in
which immediate relief is appropriate, rather than to silence orders. If
the silence order is merely announced from the bench,48 the lack of
adversary procedure could be used to deny an appeal. But the lack of
media participation, rather than an excuse for denying appealability,
provides the very reason why review should be granted.49 Since the
media are potentially affected by a silence order, they should partici-
pate in the process of deciding whether an order is necessary and draft-
"See generally Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 403 (1968); Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 459 (1968).
"See generally Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 403, 422 (1968).
'lid. at 451-52.
2Id. at 429-31.
13Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 169, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 246 (1973).
"Sun Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873, 878 (1973) (6 months).
5Wood v. Goodson, 485 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Ark. 1972).
"See Wahpeton Pub. School Dist. No. 37 v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n, 166 N.W.2d 389,
392 (N.D. 1969).
tSee Graham v. Minter, 437 F.2d 427, 428 (1st Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
"'United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Wood v. Goodson,
485 S.W.2d 213 (Ark. 1972) (telephone).
"Cf. Dobbs, Contempt of Court-A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 183, 218-19 (1971).
19731
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ing any order determined to be necessary." The absence of the media
might, but should not, affect appealability. Applying the usual appeala-
bility analysis to silence orders does no more than illustrate the unique
character of the silence order; it clearly does not produce certain results.
Characterizing a silence order as an appealable preliminary injunc-
tion, however, may be contrary to precedent. In Miller v. United
States5 the district judge forbade a convicted defendant from contacting
jury members, and the defendant appealed that order.5 On appeal, the
issue whether the circuit court possessed jurisdiction to review the order
was taken up sua sponte. Reviewing the order as a petition for manda-
mus, the court doubted first that the district judge's order was an injunc-
tion and secondly that, even if the order was an injunction, an interlocu-
tory appeal could be allowed from a preliminary injunction in a criminal
case.53 Basing its decision on these doubts, the court denied injunctive
review. The court reasoned that the order was unrelated to the substan-
tive issues in the case, and that, in general, criminal cases should not
be delayed by interlocutory appeals.54 Both these reasons apply equally
to silence orders and both point to denying review to silence orders as
preliminary injunctions. Review of a silence order as an injunction,
nevertheless, remains at least arguable in the federal system and in those
state systems which allow immediate review of interlocutory injunc-
tions. Reliance on an injunction theory to obtain review, however, would
be premature, and in states that do not have pre-final judgment review
of injunctions, another method must be sought.
Even if a silence order is construed to be a final order, an appeala-
ble interlocutory order, or a preliminary injunction, formidable barriers
exist to securing review, attaining a reversal and profiting from the
victory. If the silence order is treated as an injunction, the first step is
to move in the trial court to dissolve, set aside or modify. Then the
media faces the normal stages of the appellate process: notice, briefing,
submission and decision. An appeal from a silence order cannot follow
a customary briefing schedule which frequently takes several months,
for if the criminal trial proceeds while the appeal is pending, the asserted
'QThis possibility was mentioned in Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 148, 106 Cal. Rptr.
225, 231 (1973).
5'403 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight
Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972).
"The criminal conviction had already been affirmed. Miller v. United States, 381 F.2d 529
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 929 (1968).
"Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77, 78-79, 84 (2d Cir. 1968).
"Id. at 79.
[Vol. 52
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right to publish may be lost. The appeal, accordingly, must be placed
before an appellate court as expeditiously as possible. This may be done
by an accelerated appeal as provided by appellate rule55 or by suspend-
ing the rules.5" An alternative route is a motion, addressed to the appel-
late court, to stay or suspend the order or injunction.5 Because of the
need for haste, the silence order may be won or lost on motion to the
appellate court to stay the lower court's order. When the interests are
significant and the need for a timely decision is clear, appellate courts
have been able to respond quickly through these mechanisms.55
THE PREROGATIVE WRITS
An extraordinary or prerogative writ is another potential route to
review of a silence order. Certiorari, mandamus or prohibition are the
relevant writs treated here. The use of prerogative writs for review of a
silence order should be distinguished from use of writs (1) to obtain
judicial review of administrative action, (2) to request a second appellate
review, for example, the United States Supreme Court's statutory writ
of certiorari and (3) to review contempt. In this narrow area, doctrine
and tradition tend to be parochial and precedents from one jurisdiction
do not apply to another.59 However, three analytically separate inquiries
must be made before use of a prerogative writ is deemed appropriate:
(1) whether the appellate *court has jurisdiction under the applicable
statutes; (2) whether the appellate court, having determined that it has
jurisdiction, will exercise its discretion to hear the writ; and (3)whether
the ambit of appellate inquiry or scope of review is sufficiently compre-
hensive. Appellate courts tend to use vague, all-purpose phrases like
"abuse of discretion" when discussing all three problems, but analysis
"Alabama Supreme Court Rule 47 allows the court, upon application, to reduce filing times
and advance the date of submission, ALA. S. Cr. R. 47; IOWA R. Civ. P. 345.1; N.J. Cr. R. 2:9-
2.
"6FED. R. App. P. 2.
5FED. R. App. P 8(a); IOWA R. Civ. P. 347; N.C. CT. App. R. 34.
"Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. City of Mobile, 457 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1972); Tape Head
Co. v. RCA, 452 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1971); United States Servicemen's Fund v. Shands, 440 F.2d
44 (4th Cir. 1971); Kolden v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 4,406 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1969), vacated
on other grounds, 397 U.S. 47 (1970); In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,
331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d
772, 774-75 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962).
5See, e.g., Guaranty Funding v. Bolling, 288 Ala. 319, 260 So. 2d 589 (1972); Nelson, The
Rules of Procedure for Special Actions: Long Awaited Reform of Extraordinary Writ Practice in
Arizona, I I ARIZ. L. REv. 413 (1969); Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All
Writs Act, 86 HARV. L. REv. 595 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Mandamus].
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is furthered by keeping the distinct issues separately in mind.
The litigant, assertedly aggrieved by a trial court ruling, files an
application for the writ in the appellate court." The writ may be denied
with a brief order."1 However, if the writ is granted, a response is filed
and the cause is submitted."2 The reported cases normally deal with the
merits of the issue rather than with the decision to grant the writ, and
the standards both of jurisdiction and discretion are obscure and uncer-
tain.13 Traditionally, the writs were granted only to test trial court
jurisdiction. Chafee has maintained that jurisdiction subject to challenge
by the writs meant simply jurisdiction over the person and jurisdiction
of the court to decide the subject matter of the case before it." This
doctrinal view would restrict writs to a limited class of cases and would
remit almost all litigants to the delay of a trial and to a time consuming
appeal from a final judgment. Appellate courts have evaded this doctrin-
alism6" by defining jurisdiction in relation to the type of issue before the
trial court,66 incorporating the line between law and equity into the
definition of jurisdiction 7 or expanding jurisdiction to include more
classes of asserted error.6" Thus today appellate courts have jurisdiction
to review almost everything that a trial court may do. The question
becomes whether the court in its discretion should issue the writ. The
"FED. R. App. P. 25(a); IOWA R. Civ. P. 309; 9 MOORE 110.30.
"Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 93-94 n. 2-3 (1967); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S.
192, 193 n.2 (1966) (order denying writ); United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 519 n.18 (5th
Cir. 1972); Warren & Abell, supra note 3, at 62 n.46. The California Court of Appeals described
District Attorney Younger's experience concerning an earlier order:
After the assassination of Senator Kennedy in June 1968, the Los Angeles Superior
Court had issued a protective order which Younger attacked in this court. What he got
for his pains was mostly postcards: one from this court, denying his petition without
issuance of an alternative writ, another from the California Supreme Court, denying his
petition for a hearing. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari ....
Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 144 n.6, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 n.6 (1973) (citations
omitted). The court then sent Younger another. Id. at -, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 235, discussed in
note 181 infra.
2FED. R. App. P. 21(b).
63Weight Watchers of Philadelphia, Inc. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 775
(2d Cir. 1972); see Mandamus, supra note 59, at 605, 607-08, 612.
"Z. CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, LACK OF POWER AND MISTAKEN USE OF POWER
296 (1948).
""Jurisdiction" is not used in the "technical" sense. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95
(1967).
"State ex reL Zeller v. Montgomery Circuit Court, 223 Ind. 476, 62 N.E.2d 149 (1945).
67Tawas & Bay County Ry. v. losco, 44 Mich. 479, 7 N.W. 65 (1880).
"Abelleira v. District Court, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 285-91, 109 P.2d 942, 946-49 (1941): McHenry
v. State, 91 Miss. 652, 44 So. 831 (1907).
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factors considered are the importance of the challenged ruling and the
need for a quick review.69 The appellate court might also consider
whether the occasion demands judgment detached from the dispute at
hand as well as collective judgment and responsibility." These consider-
ations which are matters of judgment and discretion 71 are frequently
concealed by a fog of arcane doctrine and archaic over-conceptualism.
Although extraordinary writs have the advantage of speed, they
detract from the policies of finality and orderly terminal review. The
writs, accordingly, are not available to test all potentially reversible
errors but are reserved to review "extraordinary" matters.7 Therefore
difficulties do not end when the writ is granted, for the appellate court
may apply a limited scope of review. Thus, contentions which might be
reversible for error on terminal review may not be included in the ambit
of appellate inquiry. The appellate court might observe that the writ is
not a substitute for an appeal or that the writ is available only to test
gross abuses of discretion and might therefore either deny the writ or
find against the petitioner.
Silence orders appear to satisfy the criteria for obtaining review by
extraordinary writ. Prior restraints imposed by silence orders impinge
drastically upon first amendment rights.73 The urgency for a prompt
decision is clear. The necessity for a collective and detached judgment
of the merits is also apparent, for in many silence order cases, the trial
judge seems to be personally involved.7 1 In others, the judge appears to
overlook the interests of the press completely in his zeal to protect the
criminal trial from potentially prejudicial publicity.75 In addition, most
of the free press-fair trial law has been formulated in appeals from
"The standards for issuing the writ are called "standards of propriety" in an excellent recent
note on federal cases, Mandamus, supra note 59, at 596 n.7.
"Carrington, supra note 24, at 512-13.
"Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943); Needles v. Kelley, 261 Iowa 815,
156 N.W.2d 276 (1968).
"Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967); De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States,
325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945) (usurpation of power). See also 9 MOORE 110.28; Mandamus, supra
note 59; Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1077 (1965); Note,
Appellate Review of Stay Orders in the Federal Courts, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 518, 535 (1972).
"Authorities cited note 15 supra.
"
4See Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); cf. People v. Jelke, 308
N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
"United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1972); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966); Younger v. Smith, 130 Cal. App. 3d 138, 156-
57, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1973); State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 483
P.2d 608, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
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criminal convictions in which the defendant argued that pretrial public-
ity was prejudicial to him. Trial courts need guidelines from appellate
courts on the other side of the free press-fair trial question, that is, when
does an order unnecessarily circumscribe the right of the press to report
and the public to know. Thus, review of a silence order by extraordinary
writ, at the instance of the media, seems to be a propitious point for an
appellate court to interpose on behalf of an important interest."
However, even when jurisdiction to hear the writ is assumed, sev-
eral barriers are encountered in the path of effective review. First, the
appellate court must exercise its discretion to grant review, and the
issues must be placed before the appellate court in a timely fashion.
Secondly, the appellate court must find that the media possesses the
requisite interest or standing to compel a decision. Finally, the appellate
court's scope -of review must be broad enough to include the question
presented, and the decision must be handed down in time to allow the
media to provide timely news. The author has found only one reported
case in which the media, with apparent success, attained appellate re-
view of a silence order by extraordinary writ. In State ex rel. The Miami
Herald v. Rose77 the trial judge issued a pretrial order part of which
forbade the media from disseminating anything about the murder trial
except testimony in open court. The Miami Herald sought a writ of
prohibition in the district court of appeal. 7 The court of appeal, in a
two paragraph, per curiam opinion, construed the procedural device as
a constitutional writ,7 and held that the ban on publishing was an
invalid prior restraint." The assailed order was not reversed but stayed.
The stay, presumably, ended the controversy, for unless the defen-
dant were to be convicted and were to appeal citing prejudicial publicity,
the publicity issue would probably not be in controversy again. If the
jury were sequestered, as the court of appeal suggested, a successful
attack would be unlikely. This case is an example of a flexible appellate
system responding promptly to a difficult problem. By use of the prerog-
ative writ and the stay, the court was able to shape a preventative
remedy and to surmount the problems of the media's lack of party
status and the need for a prompt decision.
"
6 Cf. Mandamus, supra note 59, at 618-19.
"271 So. 2d 483 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972) (per curiam).7
'FLA. APP. R. 4.5(c).
11271 So. 2d at 484, construing, FLA. APP. R. 4.5(g).
10271 So. 2d at 484. See also Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 155-56, 106 Cal. Rptr.
228, 236-37 (1973) and cases cited note 15 supra.
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Several other appellate decisions are sufficiently analogous to bear
review. In Miller v. United States,"1 a convicted defendant appealed
from the district judge's order interdicting inquiries to jurors. Judge
Friendly, examining appellate jurisdiction, expressed doubt that the
order was appealable as a preliminary injunction, 2 and rejected appeal-
ability as a collateral order," but reviewed the appeal from the order
as a petition for mandamus or prohibition because an important issue
of first impression was presented. 4 The Miller case, however, does not
reach the problem of a review at the request of a media representative
not a party to the criminal action. In addition, because the order was
given after, rather than before or during the trial, the need for prompt
review was not at issue.
Chase v. Robson85 is somewhat more on point. In that case the
petitioners were indicted for events arising out of destruction of selective
service records. About ten weeks before the trial was scheduled to begin,
the district judge, sua sponte, ordered the parties to refrain from gener-
ating any publicity about the case. The defendants petitioned the court
of appeals for mandamus and prohibition. The court of appeals found
that mandamus was appropriate to raise the question because the order
was unrelated to the issues at trial and a prior restraint,86 immediate
appellate review was imperative, 7 and the matter could not be ade-
quately reviewed on direct appeal.88 The court reviewed the silence order
to determine whether it was "a clear abuse of discretion" and held that
it must be vacated because it infringed on first amendment freedoms,89
was overbroad" and lacked specific findings of fact. 1 Robson, like
Miller, did not reach the problem of a media representative not a party
to the criminal action seeking review. However, Robson provides an
insight into the response of the appellate process to the time element
involved in most silence order cases. The district judge's order was dated
81403 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1968). Miller is reviewed and criticized in Mandamus, supra note 59,
at 616 n.89, 619 n.97.
11403 F.2d at 78-79. Text at notes 51-53 supra.
8403 F.2d at 79 n.1; see text accompanying notes 11-19 supra.
1"403 F.2d at 79, citing Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964).
"435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
1d. at 1062.
"Id.
uId.
92Id.
11ld. at 1061.
11Id. at 1061-62.
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February 24. The court of appeals directed that the order be vacated
on May 1. The trial was scheduled to begin on May 4. If the defendants
had obeyed the order, they would have lost their first amendment free-
doms for about nine weeks. These weeks may have been crucial because
of the defendants' desire to raise funds to finance their defense and to
communicate their grievances to the public. While mandamus may be
an available remedy in the federal system, it is far from a fully satisfac-
tory remedy.
In California the extraordinary writs are flexible devices to review
many kinds of pretrial orders. For example, when extensive pre-trial
publicity has occurred, a defendant may, prior to trial, use the writ of
mandate to review a decision refusing to change the venue to a location
less saturated with publicity.2 Three California cases bear review here.
The first grew out of an application to enjoin official release of almost
all pre-arraignment publicity in criminal cases. The officials who were
to be enjoined sought a writ of prohibition in the district court of appeals
to prevent the trial court from granting the injunction. Local newspa-
pers appeared as amicus curiae. The court of appeals issued prohibi-
tion94 holding that an injunction was an improper remedy to prevent
excessive publicity and that the proposed remedy was too broad for the
evil assertedly involved. 5 Like the federal cases previously discussed,
this case indicates that an extraordinary writ possesses the elements of
a proper remedy. It does not, however, solve the question of whether
the media has standing to contest the order. The case, moreover, was
in litigation for about a year from the request for the injunction to the
grant of the writ.96 Even though the injunction was not directed toward
a particular prosecution and did not take effect, this lapse of time
undercuts the media's requirement of prompt review.
In Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior Court97 the district court of
appeals faced several of these issues. The judge who was trying a crimi-
nal case entered an order closing to the public portions of the trial which
took place outside the presence of the jury. Newspaper representatives
petitioned the court of appeals for mandate to vacate the order. The
2Frazier v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. 3d 287, 486 P.2d 694, 95 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1971); Maine v,
Superior Court, 68 Cal. 2d 375, 438 P.2d 372, 66 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1968). See also Lloyd v. District
Court, 201 N.W.2d 720 (Iowa 1972); Pollard v. District Court, 200 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa 1972).
"County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. App. 2d 670, 62 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1967).
11Id. at _ 62 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
'1d. at ., 62 Cal. Rptr. at 441-49.
"Id. at , 62 Cal. Rptr. at 437-38.
'7261 Cal. App. 2d 505, 68 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1968).
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issue was public trial, not free press and the newspaper's standing was
asserted and found in the general right of the public to have access to a
criminal trial.98 The writ was issued ordering the trial judge to vacate
the exclusion order.9 The opinion lacks precedential value because the
California Supreme Court subsequently granted a hearing and, because
of a change of venue of criminal trial, dismissed the appeal as moot."0
The ultimate disposition of Oxnard Publishing Co. indicates that the
interest in proceeding with the criminal trial may take precedence over
the rights of the press and the public. In a more recent case 1' the trial
court prohibited newspapers from publishing the names and photo-
graphs of witnesses in a criminal trial. The newspapers compiled with
the order and refrained from publishing but sought a writ of mandate
to vacate the order. The criminal trial proceeded, and the defendants
were convicted long before the court of appeals vacated the order. Thus,
by obeying the order and testing it in an orderly fashion, the newspaper
lost the right that the appellate court later said it had. The writ, in the
absence of a stay of the order 12 is not a practical solution for the silence
order.
New York and Ohio cases support the conclusion that, while an
extraordinary writ is the media's proper legal remedy for an overreach-
ing silence order, it is an impractical solution. United Press Associations
v. Valente,' decided by the New York Court of Appeals, was an
Article 78 proceeding0 4 brought by a media group petitioning to open
up a criminal trial which had been closed to the public. The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed the closing of the trial, although the criminal
conviction from the underlying trial was later reversed because it had
been closed.' The court held that the appeal by the media turned on
the right to a public trial which themajority found to be a right of the
'lid. at -, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 88-96. But see ADVISORY COMMITrEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE
PRESS, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 116 (Approved Draft 1968) (public
trial not a guarantee to public) [hereinafter cited as REARDON REPORT].
"1261 Cal. App. 2d at _ 68 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
'coWarren & Abell, supra note 3, at 66 n.63, 78 n.123.
'Sun Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1973).
102Cf. Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 149, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 232 (1973) (stay denied
on one petition and granted in another-criminal trial evidently pending when silence order peti-
tions decided).
'0308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
0 Article 78 proceedings are herein classified as extraordinary writ cases rather than interlocu-
tory appeals. There is no good reason for this except the author's preference, the presence of the
judge as respondent and hints in the opinions about the scope of review.
'1People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
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criminal defendant; and, because of the chaos that might result from
stays and appeals at the behest of the public at large, the media repre-
sentatives were held to lack standing to attack the order. 00
Valente was distinguished in 1972 in Oliver v. Postel' 7 in which a
criminal trial was closed to the press. The Appellate Division dismissed
the Article 78 proceeding commenced by newspaper representatives.,"8
On appeal the Court of Appeals dismissed the proceeding as moot
because the criminal trial had ended." 9 However, the court stated in
dicta that, because the order was directed to the newspapers, they had
standing to challenge the order and that the order closing the trial was
"an unwarranted effort to punish and censor the press.""'
E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton,"' an Ohio case, is similarly inconclu-
sive. The public was excluded from a criminal trial, and the newspapers
sought prohibition in the court of appeals. The criminal trial ended
before a decision on prohibition, but the court of appeals, nevertheless,
allowed the writ and held that the defendant could not waive the public's
right to a public trial and that the exclusion order was, under the circum-
stances, unjustified." 2 The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed a direct
appeal from the court of appeals because the issues were moot before
the court of appeals had decided them and because the matter was not
cognizable by prohibition."'
The value of direct review is not difficult to summarize. With the
exception of State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Rose, the
'"United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 81-85, 123 N.E.2d 777, 781-83 (1954). Six
judges participated; two concurred in the majority opinion. Judge Desmond concurred in the result,
asserting that the newspapers had standing to contest the closing of the trial but that it was
permissible to close the trial. Id. at 85-87, 123 N.E. 2d at 783-84. Judge Frossell dissented, Judge
Dye with him, contending that there was an individual or citizen interest in public trials and that
the newspapers had standing to assert the interest but would have dismissed the proceeding as
moot. Id. at 87-92, 123 N.E.2d at 784-87. Thus, there is a lack of solidarity to the holding and
certainty to the case. The standing issue tied three to three. Concerning status of the public trial
issue, see Warren & Abell, supra note 3, at 77-78; authorities cited note 98 supra.
1-30 N.Y.2d 171, 282 N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972).
"'Oliver v. Postel, 37 App. Div. 2d 498, 327 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1971).
"30 N.Y.2d at 183, 282 N.E.2d at 312, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 415-16.
"Id., 282 N.E.2d at 311, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
"1100 Ohio App. 157, 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955), appeal dismissed as moot, 164 Ohio 261, 130
N.E.2d 701 (1955).
"11100 Ohio App. at _., 125 N.E.2d at 903-04.
"'E.W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 164 Ohio 261, 263-64, 130 N.E.2d 701, 703 (1955) (per
curiam). Two judges concurred in dismissing the appeal maintaining that the trial judge could not
appeal because the court of appeals order did not prohibit him from doing anything and was,
therefore, not prejudicial.
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prospects for effective direct review are dim. Doctrinal limitations, sta-
tutory limitations and limitations on time available render direct review
difficult, if not impossible. Time problems are intractable because the
media's contentions are inextricably locked in with the progress of the
criminal trial. Pre-judgment appeals are exceptional; interlocutory ap-
peals in criminal cases are rare; and persons lacking party status who
cannot intervene in the main action are strangers in the appellate court.
The administrative problems are also formidable. Will collateral pro-
ceedings in an appellate court cause chaos in the underlying trial? "
Who has standing to seek review?"' Does the criminal trial stop during
the pendency of review? May the media seek a continuance? Can there
be a stay of a silence order without a continuance of the trial? Would a
stay of the order pending review prejudice a conviction in a later appeal?
If the defendant's interest is opposed to the media, may his objections
be heard and considered?' Might review and a continuance interfere
with the defendant's right to a speedy trial?17 If there is no continuance,
is it possible to attain an appellate decision in time to be of any practical
assistance?"8 What is true of review by extraordinary writ is also true
'Compare the opinion of Judge Fuld in United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 83,
123 N.E.2d 777, 782 (1954), "[I]f every member of the public were free to challenge any order
... . the court might well be overwhelmed with a host of collateral proceedings", with the
dissenting opinion of Judge Frossell, id. at 95, 123 N.E.2d at 789, "This view is wholly unrealistic
and without slightest foundation."
"'Judge Frossell, dissenting in United States Ass'ns v. Valente, asked, "Unless some member
of the public is entitled to bring a proceeaing such as this, how else could it be settled?" Id. at 95,
123 N.E.2d at 789. See also Phoenix Newspapers Inc. v Jennings, 107 Ariz. 557, 563, 490 P.2d
563, 567 (1971): "[Any member of the public has a standing to question his exclusion from a
judicial hearing."
"'In State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Rose, 271 So. 2d 483 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972)
(per curiam), the defendant is listed as having appeared before the appellate court. In Younger v.
Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 142, 147 n.14, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 227, 231 n.14 (1973), one criminal
defendant did not appear in the appellate court but another did. In Sun Co. v. Superior Court, 29
Cal. App. 3d 815, 105 Cal. Rptr. 873, 874 (1973), neither defendant argued the silence order in
the appellate court. The trial had long since ended. Judge Fuld, in United Press Ass'ns v. Valente,
observed "[P]etitioners sought, in effect, to have us pass upon the merits of [the defendant's] appeal
although he could not be heard. There is something essentially wrong and unreasonable about a
procedure that permits such a result." 308 N.Y. at 83, 123 N.E.2d at 782. Judge Frossell remon-
strated "[E]ven though [defendant] did appeal, he would be testing his own right, not the pub-
lic's. . . .The public right did not depend upon the happenstance that defendant might be con-
victed, and if so, that he might appeal." Id. at 94, 123 N.E.2d at 789.
'This may be especially important where the defendant has a statutory right to a speedy trial
within a fixed time. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 795.2 (Supp. 1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
10.46.010 (1961).
11in E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, the newspapers sought a writ the day the trial judge closed
the criminal trial. The trial was completed during the pendency of the extraordinary proceeding
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of other forms of terminal or interlocutory review. There is no realistic
route to relief in the appellate hierarchy." 9
APPEAL FROM SANCTION
Another route to relief, although a drastic one, is for the media to
ignore the silence order and publish. Many silence order appeals by the
media occur as follows. The judge trying a criminal court case issues a
silence order. When the media publishes despite the order, the court
finds the publisher or reporter in contempt of court, and the contemnor
appeals from the order finding contempt and imposing sanction. In
addition to avoiding the practical and legal perplexities of securing
direct or extraordinary review of a silence order, there are additional
reasons for the media to prefer review from contempt. The media repre-
sentatives might not have the time and money to challenge every silence
order; also the law of prior restraints is reasonably clear and, under the
pressure of a deadline, time is not available to consult counsel.
To hold a newspaperman in contempt for publishing what happens
in open court is a drastic step. The Advisory Committee on Fair Trial
and Free Press of the American Bar Association disavowed "direct
restrictions on the media."'2 0 The committee stated that contempt raised
"grave constitutional questions"'' and could "cause unnecessary fric-
tion and stifle desirable discussion."' 22 The committee added, however,
that contempt "should be exercised against a person who knowingly
violates a valid judicial order not to disseminate, until completion of the
trial or disposition without trial, specified information referred to in the
course of a judicial hearing. . ." held before trial or out of the presence
and the latter was dismissed as moot. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
"'Counsel might consider procedural alternatives which do not require a direct step up in the
judicial hierarchy. One possibility is to seek relief from a judge of equal rank to the judge who
issued the silence order. This will not work. Seale v. Hoffman, 306 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
Another is to ask a federal court to enjoin a state court silence order because the order impinges
upon federal constitutional rights. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1970); Sutton v. County
Court, 353 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Wis. 1973). This route is, of course, closed if the silence order is
issued by a federal court. If the silence order is issued by a state judge, it may be effective. See
Rosen v. North Carolina, 345 F. Supp. 1364 (W.D.N.C. 1972). But see King v. Jones, 450 F.2d
478 (6th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); McLucas v. Palmer, 427 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 937 (1970). The federal injunction should always be considered a live possibility in the state
silence order case.
2
'REARDON REPORT 151.
' 'REARDON REPORT 150.
12REARDON REPORT 150.
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of the jury. lz Under these circumstances, the committee felt contempt
would not be an unconstitutional abridgment of speech or press."2 4 The
Medina Report125 also disavowed any intent to control the media and
eschewed contempt against anyone in the pretrial period. However, the
report did note that "the trial judge has power also to enforce and to
punish deliberate and willful conduct in flagrant disobedience of such
"orders" or other "directions". 12 A report to the Judicial Conference
of the United States 127 observed that "any direct curb or restraint on
publication . . . is both unwise as a matter of policy and poses serious
constitutional problems" and could not be recommended.t28 It did rec-
ommend special orders in widely publicized and sensational cases but
did not mention contempt for publication."2 The main thrust of the
effort to insure a trial untainted by prejudicial publicity, then, is by
control of those amenable to control, court personnel and officers of the
court, and by devices such as venue changes or sequestering the jury.
Contempt is retained as a deprecated but distinct final alternative.
Contempts are divided conceptually into several different but over-
lapping categories, and contempt for publishing material about a crimi-
nal trial despite a silence order fits two of these recognized categories.
It is indirect contempt because it is performed out of the presence of
the court. It is also criminal because, when contempt is charged, the
harm has already been done. The penalty is, thus, punitive and cannot
be coercive or remedial. Procedural protections flow from the indirect-
criminal classification, and the contemnor is entitled to a hearing and
some criminal safeguards in guilt determining process.13
Ignoring a silence order is difficult to classify within the usual acts-
of-contempt categories. Disseminating information might be considered
obstruction of the courts processes because, if present or potential jurors
learn of inadmissible evidence, the court is not challenged directly, but
12 REARDON REPORT § 4.1, at 150.
"'REARDON REPORT 153.
"2SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FINAL REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS,
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL Vii (1967) [hereinafter cited as MEDINA REPORT].
"'MEDINA REPORT 1, 6, 10-11, 39-40, 36-37.
'"REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM IN THE "FREE PRESS-
FAIR TRIAL" ISSUE, 45 F.R.D. 391 (1969).
128d. at 401-02.
'"Id. at 409-12.
"'United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1972); Dobbs, supra note 49, at
183, 221-23, 224-25.
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the fairness of the trial may be affected.' However, distinguishing
features exist. First, acts normally considered obstruction, such as per-
suading witnesses to leave the jurisdiction, bribing witnesses, and direct
attempts to influence jurors have as their immediate goal a desire to
alter the trial. Secondly, such obstructive acts are against the general
moral code, while publishing material about public proceedings is
usually felt to be in the public interest and, except for the silence order,
a laudable activity.
Publications despite a silence order also partake of contempt for
out of court publication.' The thrust of this form of contempt, how-
ever, is to protect the dignity of the court rather than the fairness of a
trial. Moreover, in the leading cases dealing with this category of con-
tempt, which were decided before the important free press-fair trial
cases, an order was not issued to provide warning of the conduct that
was forbidden .13  Nor does the contempt for violation of a silence
order fit neatly into the category of contempt for violating an order.'34
In the usual court order-contempt case, an in personam order, tempo-
rary or final, is requested by a plaintiff as part of the main relief in the
case and is directed against a party to the lawsuit over whom jurisdiction
has been obtained,'35 for example, requiring a defendant to abate a
nuisance, or forbidding a defendant's demonstration or ordering defen-
dant to convey property. By contrast, a silence order which is issued
often on the judge's own motion and sometimes on the motion of one
of the parties is often directed against persons not parties to the criminal
action who do not receive formal notice and who are not represented. 3"
Thus, contempt for publishing material about a criminal proceeding
despite a silence order is similar to several categories of acts-of-
contempt but, at the same time, sufficiently different not to fit neatly
into the conventional analytical categories.
In the federal system, orders finding a contemnor guilty of con-
'See Dobbs, supra note 49, at 189-94.
'Id. at 208-19.
1'Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 368 (1947); Pennekamp
v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Contra. United States
v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
1'3 Dobbs, supra note 49, at 219-20; cf Wood v. Goodson, 485 S.W.2d 213 (Ark. 1972).
'"Dobbs, supra note 49, at 219; Developments in the Law: Injunctions, 78 HARV. L, REv.
994, 1056-61 (1965).
'Compare Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, -, 106 Cal Rptr. 225, 231 (1973);
with Sun Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, _ , 105 Cal. Rptr. 873, 875-76 (1973)
(press invited; attorney present).
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tempt and imposing sentence are appealable. 37 In the various states,
indirect, criminal contempts are reviewable either by direct appeal, writ
of error, certiorari, prohibition or habeas corpus."' Many of the diffi-
culties encountered in attaining review of a silence order are obviated
in a contempt appeal. The convicted contemnor is a party and has
standing. The material has already been published, and the time re-
quired for appeal is generally not crucial.
While a silence order is easier to place before an appellate court
upon a review of contempt than by direct review, the appellate court's
ambit of inquiry on contempt frequently places barriers in the path of
full review on the merits. The problem in contempt appeals is not in
securing review but in securing complete and effective review. The major
difficulty in determining the scope of review flows from the classifica-
tion of criminal contempt for breach of an order as a collateral attack
on that order.'39 Definite results flow from classifying an attack as
collateral rather than direct. While the review on direct appeal is for
legal error, properly preserved and asserted, the permissible grounds for
successful attack in a collateral proceeding are limited. In general, only
a judgment void for lack of jurisdiction is vulnerable to collateral at-
tack. 4' Thus, since contempt is often held to be collateral to the order
violated, the contemnor is precluded from asserting mere legal error in
the underlying order, 4' but must assert only that the order is void1 2 for
lack of jurisdiction.' In contempts for violating injunctions this con-
cept is termed the collateral bar rule, and many courts hold that even
though the order or injunction was granted ex parte,'"1 or improperly
'"9 MOORE 9 110.13[41, at 164.
raThe subject is tangled and no substitute exists for a careful search of the statutes, procedural
rules, and case law in the particular jurisdiction. See United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Local
7918 UMW, 274 So. 2d 637 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1971), rev'd per curiam, 290 Ala. 156, 274 So.
2d 640 (1972), on remand, 274 So. 2d 644 (Ala. Ct. Crim. App. 1973) (per curiam). A good place
to find the cases is Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 448 (1970); Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 589 (1970). That the
two annotations comprise over 200 pages is an indication of the variety and complexity of the
subject.
e'United States ex rel. Bowles v. Seidmon, 154 F.2d 229, 231 (7th Cir. 1946), citing Howat
v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181 (1922).
"IF. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 534 (1965).
"'Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 279 Ala. 53, 181 So.
2d 493 (1966), affd, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
"'Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Teamsters Local 61, 11 N.C. App. 159, 180 S.E.2d 461,
cert. denied, 278 N.C. 701, 181 S.E.2d 601 (1971); F. JAMES, supra note 140, at 535 (1965).
"'Exparte Bryant, 155 Tex. 219, 285 S.W.2d 719 (1956).
"'Anderson v. Dean, 354 F. Supp. 639 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Sumbry v. Land, 127 Ga. App. 786,
195 S.E.2d 228,234 (1972); UMW Hosp. v. UMW Dist. 50, 52 Il. 2d 496, 288 N.E.2d 455 (1972).
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circumscribed constitutionally protected freedoms," 5 or was otherwise
erroneous,"' the contemnor who has disobeyed the order is precluded
from arguing these matters as a defense to contempt. The only issues
raised on a charge of contempt are whether the court had jurisdiction
over the subject matter and whether the contemnor knew of the order
and violated it.' The reasons for the collateral bar rule are not based
merely on the conceptual direct-collateral attack distinction but on the
idea that the collateral bar rule preserves respect for courts and provides
for the orderly settlement of disputes. Thus according to the courts
which apply the collateral bar rule, the defendant should not be allowed
to flout the order and thereby appoint himself judge in his own case.'
Other courts reject the collateral bar rule in reviewing contempt for
breach of an injunction.' Under this view decisions on the merits are
more important than preserving respect for the courts, and while orderly
litigation is important, a defendant, because "he may conclude that the
exigencies of the situation or the magnitude of the rights involved render
immediate action worth the cost of peril," has the alternative of disobey-
ing the order and arguing infirmities in the order on a charge of con-
tempt.'50
When a judge orders a newspaper not to publish the proceedings
of a trial, he subjects the newspaper to prior restraint.' The issue in
the contempt appeal is whether a media representative who has pub-
lished despite the order is precluded, by the collateral bar rule, from
raising constitutional defenses to a charge of contempt of court. Should
the collateral bar rule be imposed to insulate potential errors of consti-
tutional magnitude from judicial scrutiny? Several reasons suggest dis-
pensing with the collateral bar rule in silence order contempts. The first
argument is that the crucial or basic nature of the substantive right
"'City of Chicago v. King, 86 II1. App. 2d 340, 230 N.E.2d 41 (1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1028 (1969). Z. CHAFEE, supra note 64, at 344-48. But see State ex rel. Liversey v. District Court,
34 La. Ann. 741 (1882).
'County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 II1. 2d 166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970).
'See generally Tefft, Neither Above the Law Nor Below It: A Note on Walker v.
Birmingham, 1967 Sup. Cr. REV. 181.
'Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1967); United States v. Fidanian, 465
F.2d 755, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1972); Board of Junior College Dist. No. 508 v. Teachers Local 1600,
126 III. App. 2d 418, 428-29, 262 N.E.2d 125, 130, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 998 (1971); Teft, supra
note 147.
"'In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 483 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968); State ex rel. Liversey
v. District Court, 34 La. Ann. 741 (1882).
'mYounger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 151-53, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 233-34 (1973),
'See authorities cited note 15 supra.
[Vol. 52
REVIEW OF SILENCE ORDERS
asserted should warrant review of the silence order on the merits.112
Clearly, review of the constitutionality of the order will not allow the
media to publish with impunity in the face of a valid silence order. The
order will be judged on the merits, and if it was justified, contempt will
be properly affirmed.' Secondly, as previously discussed, excruciating
practical and legal difficulties prevent securing effective direct review of
a silence order.'54 Moore states this qualification on the collateral bar
rule "if. . .review cannot be had in the absence of a contempt convic-
tion, the contemnor may challenge the underlying order on appeal from
the judgment of contempt."' 5 In view of the basic right asserted, these
difficulties should compel review of the contempt order on the merits.
Several additional arguments against application of the collateral
bar rule appear when silence orders are examined in relation to the
classic statement of the collateral bar rule. In Howat v. Kansas,'56 a
1922 appeal from a finding of contempt for striking in defiance of an
injunction, the Supreme Court, affirming the contempt in a unanimous
opinion by Chief Justice Taft, stated what seem to be several limits on
the operation of the collateral bar rule:
An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction with
equity powers upon pleadings properly invoking its action, and served
upon persons made parties therein and within the jurisdiction, must be
obeyed by them however erroneous the action of the court may
be, . . .It is for the court of the first instance to determine the ques-
tion of the validity of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error
by orderly review, either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based
on its decision are to be respected, and disobedience of them is con-
tempt of its lawful authority, to be punished.'57
The Court, first of all, states that the collateral bar rule will come
into play when there is "an injunction". While "injunction" has been
expanded to include a temporary restraining order or other interlocu-
tory device issued without notice to the defendants,'58 it is questionable
5Trr. EMERSON, supra note 15, at 449-65; cf. C.V.C. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 909,
918-19, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129-31 (1973).
'Hamilton v. Municipal Court, 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1969).
154See notes 8-119 and accompanying text supra.
"-9 MOORE 110.1314] at 165. See also Justice Rosellini's concurring opinion in State ex rel.
Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69,78,483 P.2d 608, 614, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
158258 U.S. 181 (1922).
'"I1d. at 189-90.
' Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258
(1947). But cf Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (ex parte order invalidated on due
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whether the courts will consider a silence order an injunction at least
for purposes of appeal.'59 The phrase "upon pleadings properly invoking
its action" has not been extensively discussed. 6' The functional meaning
of this language must relate to the need for written warning of the
substantive relief sought by the plaintiff against a defendant, rather than
to pretrial orders or directions to persons not parties which are unre-
lated to the merits of the action."' The "pleadings" language implies
that injunctions are normally preceded by adversary adjudication and
that for the collateral bar rule to apply, the contemnors must be parties
to an action, and the order must be part of the relief sought.' The
statement that the injunction be "served" before the court will wield the
collateral bar rule relates to the notice function. The requirement of
formal service of an injunction before the defendant is bound has been
substantially qualified.' The larger point of "service", however, is that
before the collateral bar rule will apply to an appeal of indirect criminal
contempt, some device must bring home to the potential contemnor the
idea that this order is serious business. The symbolic function of the
service ritual fulfills this function while the oral order from the bench,
frequent in silence order cases, may not."4
The phrase stating that the injunction be served "upon persons
process grounds on direct appeal).
' 'See notes 32-54 and accompanying text supra.
'But see the opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court in UMW Hosp. v. UMW Dist. 50, I Ill.
App. 3d 822, 826-27, 275 N.E.2d 231, 234-35 (1971), a short lived attempt to lift a comtempt
citation from a group of strikers who had picketed in violation of an ex parte injunction, by
declaring that injunction to be erroneous and void. The Appellate Court was reversed by the Illinois
Supreme Court. 52 II1.2d 496, 288 N.E.2d 455 (1972). The Supreme Court did not mention the
Appellate Court's "no pleadings" reason for voiding the injunction. The Mine Workers' Union
Hospital cases are discussed at length in an article by the author herein, entitled Toward Due
Process in Injunction Procedure, which will appear in an early issue of the University of Illinois
Law Forum. Recent cases which appear to invoke the reasoning of the "pleadings" requirement
for applying the collateral bar rule include Lynch v. Snepp, 350 F. Supp. 1134, 1140 (W.D.N.C.
1972), rev'd, 472 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1973); Mar-Pak Michigan, Inc. v. Pointer, 226 Ga. 189, 173
S.E.2d 206 (1970); Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. V. Teamsters Local 61, 11 N.C. App. 159, 180
S.E.2d 461, cert. denied, 278 N.C. 701, 181 S.E.2d 601 (1971).
"'iCf. International Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 406 (2d Cir. 1963).
"'See Justice Rosellini's concurring opinion in State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79
Wash. 2d 69, 78, 483 P.2d 608, 614 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
16'See, e.g., In re Herndon, 325 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (per curiam); Sumbry v. Land,
127 Ga. App. 736, 195 S.E.2d 228, 233-34 (1972); Reihe v. District Court, 184 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa
1971); Dobbs, supra note 49, at 249-61. But cf. Crysler Credit Corp. v. Waegele, - Cal. App.
3d. _ , -. 105 Cal. Rptr. 914, 918-19 (1973).
6
'n Wood v. Goodson, 485 S.W.2d 213, 215 (Ark. 1972) the order was given over the
telephone.
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made parties therein" is a practical expression of the notion that courts,
when they adjudicate, do not bind the whole world."5 The media repre-
sentatives are not parties to the criminal case. They receive no formal
notice and do not participate in shaping the order. 6' They may, how-
ever, be parties to the order in one sense. The court has the duty and
the power or jurisdiction to protect the defendant's right to an untainted
criminal trial. 167 Since the silence order is an injunction16 and since
persons of the class enjoined are bound upon receipt of notice or knowl-
edge of the order,'69 according to conventional analysis, personal juris-
diction is attained, and media representatives become subject to indi-
rect, criminal contempt for conduct contrary to the order. This reason-
ing, built on the implied or inherent jurisdiction of the courts, is cer-
tainly faulty. In order to find contempt this reasoning assumes the
conclusions that the media representatives are parties and that the order
is an injunction. It subsumes the elusive matter of personal jurisdiction
into the analysis of when a person not a party is bound by an injunction.
Media representatives do not fit neatly into any of the traditional cate-
gories of persons not parties who are, nevertheless, bound by an injunc-
tion.7 1 It could be argued that media representatives are not bound and
are not subject to contempt at all. For present purposes, it is assumed
that media representatives are bound in the sense that they are members
of a class with notice and may be subject to contempt. The significant
issue is whether if they ignore the order and are charged with contempt,
they may contest the merits of the order. Due process requires notice
so that no one is bound unless he has had an opportunity to contest. The
lack of formal notice and party status, while perhaps not enough to
'IsAlemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff, 42 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.); FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d);
Gregory, Government by Injunction, 1I HARV. L. REV. 487 (1898); Note, Binding Non-parties to
Injunction Decrees, 49 MINN. L. REV. 719 (1965). But see the distressing recent case United States
v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972).
'Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 148, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 231 (1973) But cf. Sun
Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815, _ 105 Cal. Rptr. 873, 875-76 (1973) (discussion
with press: attorney appeared for press).
"'
67Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
'
85But see notes 32-54 and accompany text supra.
1
'FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d); note 163 supra.
"'(Agents, aiders and abettors, successors in interest, purchasers of the res, members of a valid
class). Note 49 MINN. L. REv., supra note 165. A student writer concludes "a court would exceed
its powers insofar as it might attempt to hold a person in contempt solely on the ground that he
violated an injunction after receiving knowledge of its provisions, Id. at 735. But cf. Dobbs, supra
note 49, at 251-52; Developments in the Law: Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1028-31 (1965).
Contra, United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972) (school cases).
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avoid binding media representatives, focuses attention on the sweeping
or legislative nature of the order and the lack of a realistic opportunity
to contest. If many are bound but a realistic opportunity to challenge
is not provided, an opportunity to challenge should be provided as a
defense to contempt.' Thus the collateral bar rule should not be em-
ployed to preclude review of the merits when a silence order is ignored
because the order is arguably non-injunctive and issued by a criminal
rather than a civil court, without the usual protections of adversary
adjudication, purporting to bind, upon mere knowledge, persons not
parties to the underlying action.
The persuasive force of the foregoing is strengthened by examining
In re Oliver7 1 in which the Seventh Circuit refused for reasons similar
to those given above to resort to the collateral bar rule in an analogous
situation. In Oliver the district court had promulgated a policy state-
ment forbidding extrajudicial statements by members of the bar about
pending litigation. Attorney Oliver, with knowledge of the policy state-
ment, held a press conference and made public statements about a
pending case. The executive committee of the district court found Oliver
in breach of the policy statement and reprimanded him. 73 On appeal,
the government argued that the collateral bar rule prevented Oliver
from challenging the merits of the policy statement. 74 The court held
that the collateral bar rule did not preclude review of the merits of the
court rule. The court reasoned that although the collateral bar rule was
operative in appeals of contempt for violating injunctions, the policy
statement was distinguishable from an injunction. The court distin-
guished the rule from an injunction in part on the ground that an attor-
ney who had not violated the rule might lack standing to appeal from
it unless he had received notice that the rule bound him.1 75
A second reason used by the court for distinguishing the policy
statement from an injunction is more instructive. The court stated that
an injunction is adjudicative and determines, from facts brought before
the court, the rights of parties brought under its jurisdiction. On the
other hand, a rule of practice promulgated by a court is analogous to a
legislative act since it is "based on facts largely anticipated" and is
'See note 155 supra.
172452 F.2d I11 (7th Cir. 1971). The final words in this controversy appear to be contained in
In re Oliver, 470 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1972) and United States v. Oliver, 470 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1972).
113n re Oliver, 308 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. III. 1970).
"'In re Oliver,452 F.2d 111, 113 (7th Cir. 1971).
115Id.; see notes 98 & 106 supra.
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binding on those not before the court. "As one who has violated a
statute and is prosecuted for such violation may challenge the validity
of the statute, so should one who has violated a rule of court be permit-
ted to challenge the validity of the rule itself.''178 In Oliver, the binding
nature of the court rule was not contested; the issue was whether the
merits of the rule could be challenged after it was disobeyed. Therefore
Oliver allows the lower court to bind by "legislating" but applies the
usual standard of review when the rule is ignored first and challenged
later.
Media representatives are not parties in the ordinary sense,177 nor
is the silence order injunctive in the usual sense. 178 These conceptual
distinctions have functional significance since a silence order is fre-
quently drafted without the usual precautions of adversary litigation to
govern the conduct of non-litigants in an uncertain and largely antici-
pated future. 179 When a silence order is announced sua sponte or follow-
ing consultation with only the attorneys in the criminal case, even
though it is a rule for a specific case rather than a general rule, it looks
very much like legislation rather than adjudication. The order, more-
over, takes on more of the appearance of legislation if it is not limited
to a specific group but purports to bind anyone who might publish.'8"
Several courts, dealing with contempt for publishing despite a si-
lence order, 8' have held that the order was void8 2 not because of lack
"'n re Oliver, 452 F.2d I 11, 114 (7th Cir. 1972). See also Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v.
State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912 (1950) (review of contempt for
breach of a rule without discussing the collateral bar rule).
"'See notes 17, 98, 106, 165-71 and accompanying text supra.
"'See notes 32-54 and accompanying text supra.
"'Cf. Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 159-61, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 238-40 (1973).
"'While discussing reviewability in Oliver, the question of whether a silence order was an order
or an injunction was discussed. The court concluded that, although the silence order is somewhat
like an injunction, it probably is a mere order and not an appealable preliminary injunction. See
notes 34-54 and accompanying text supra. Now it is seemingly argued that the silence order is not
even an adjudicative order but rather is legislative.
"'These cases distinguish cases where there was no contempt because of either lack of notice
of the order or intent to violate it. See generally Dobbs, supra note 49, at 261-65. The difficulty of
the knowledge-intent issues in silence order contempts may be observed in the cited cases. Atlanta
Newspapers, Inc. v. State, 216 Ga. 399, 116 S.E.2d 580 (1960); Worchester Telegram & Gazette,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, 354 Mass. 578, 238 N.E.2d 861 (1968); In re Matzner, 59 N.J. 437, 283
A.2d 737 (1971); see In re Anderson, 306 F. Supp. 712 (D.D.C. 1969) (mem.).
In Evelle Younger's contempt appeal which is cited throughout this article, the court held that
the press release was simply too innocuous to be a violation of the silence order. Younger v. Smith,
30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 153, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 235 (1973). Ths holding implies that in order for
the prosecution effectively to test a silence order by violating it, the release must be extreme enough
to endanger a possible conviction in the criminal case. The prosecutor's predicament is apparent.
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of subject matter or personal jurisdiction but because the order was
unconstitutional."' Some of the opinions do not discuss the collateral
bar rulei"4 while others do." 5 In either event, the reasoning is confusing.
If the ambit of the appellate court's inquiry into the underlying order is
for simple error, it is unnecessary to find the order void to reverse
contempt. It suffices for the order to be wrong. If, on the other hand,
the collateral bar rule is employed, and the silence order examined only
for lack of jurisdiction, then, to defeat contempt, the court must find
the order void. To define an unconstitutional order as void in order to
escape the collateral bar rule 8 is to define lack of jurisdiction as con-
gruent with constitutional error. 87 This reasoning distorts the usual
meanings of jurisdiction, error, voidness and collateral attack. It is also
contrary to the idea that, for the collateral bar rule, error of constitu-
tional magnitude is simple error rather than jurisdictional error. Stated
another way, a court with subject matter and personal jurisdiction has
This predicament is exacerbated by the possibility that a more extreme statement is required to
constitute contempt than to require reversal of a conviction. Cf. Worchester Telegram & Gazette,
Inc. v. Commonwealth, supra at 581, 238 N.E.2d at 863 (publication prejudicial enough to require
a mistrial not extreme enough to constitute contempt). Younger's basic contention was, however,
decided adversely to him in the Busch petition which was consolidated with Younger's contempt
appeal. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 165, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
1I2Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 259-60, 418 P.2d 594, 596.97
(1966); Wood v. Goodson, 485 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Ark. 1972); State v. Morrow, 57 Ohio App. 30,
II N.E.2d 273 (1937); Exparte McCormick, 129 Tex. Crim. 457, 463, 88 S.W.2d 104, 107 (1935);
State ex rel Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 73-78, 483 P.2d 608, 611-13, cert. denied,
404 U.S. 939 (1971). See also In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111, 115 (7th Cir. 1971); Hamilton v.
Municipal Court, 270 Cal. App. 2d 797, 76 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1969) (review of order-contempt
affirmed); Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 178-81, 282 N.E.2d 306, 309-10, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407,
411-14 (1972) (dicta); MEDINA REPORT 46 (no power); REARDON REPORT (valid judicial order).
See generally Dobbs, Trial Court Error as an Excess of Jurisdiction, 43 TEXAS L. REv. 854 (1965).
11 Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 259-60, 418 P.2d 594, 596-97
(1966); Wood v. Goodson, 485 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Ark. 1972); Exparte McCormick, 129 Tex. Crim.
457, 463, 88 S.W.2d 104, 107 (1935); State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 73-
78, 483 P.2d 608, 611-13, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). See also In re Oliver, 452 F.2d I11,
115 (7th Cir. 1971); Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 178-81, 282 N.E.2d 306,309-10, 331 N.Y.S.2d
407, 411-14 (1972) (dicta).
'"Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Ariz. 257, 418 P.2d 594 (1966); State v.
Morrow, 57 Ohio App. 30, I1 N.E.2d 273 (1937); Ex parte McCormick, 129 Tex. Crim, 457, 88
S.W.2d 104 (1935). But see Exparte Warfield, 40 Tex. Crim. 413, 50 S.W. 933 (1899) (colhteral
bar rule applied).
luState ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 73-78, 483 P.2d 608, 611, cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); see In re Oliver, 452 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1971), discussed in notes 172-
80 supra.
'"State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 73-78, 483 P.2d 608, 611-13, cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
'"United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 511 (5th Cir. 1972).
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jurisdiction to err, even to err unconstitutionally. This error must be
corrected on direct review not by collateral attack. Thus, courts employ-
ing this faulty reasoning should hold that the collateral bar rule does
not prevent courts from reversing contempt of silence orders because
basic rights are at issue, or the contemnors were not parties, or they did
not receive formal notice, or the order is not truly an injunction, or
because direct appeals are an unrealistic remedy rather than because the
silence orders are void. 18
The conclusion from the foregoing is that the collateral bar rule
should not and does not apply to silence order contempts. The second
half of the conclusion is wrong. Two federal courts of appeals have
wielded the collateral bar rule in appeals of silence order contempts
apparently to preclude review of the silence order on the merits. These
cases bear close examination.
The first, United States v. Tijerina'89 grew out of a highly charged
criminal trial in New Mexico. Reiss Tijerina and a group of followers
assumed putative sovereignty over certain land, maintaining that the
land was held in violation of a treaty, and several United States forest
rangers were "arrested" for trespassing. Several of the group were
charged with the federal offenses of assault and conversion. A pretrial
silence order was entered, without objection, forbidding public state-
ments about the upcoming criminal trial. The order recited that it was
formally served upon the parties and witnesses. Tijerina made a speech
at a widely publicized Convention of Free States, which among other
things, accused the judge of "using the law to take vengeance and drink
blood and humiliate our race." Tijerina and another were charged with
and convicted of contempt.'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit first dismissed the contemnors' argu-
ments which related to whether the order had been violated.' Then, in
response to the contention that the order was invalid under the first, fifth
"'See also Wood v. Goodson, 485 S.W.2d 213,218-22 (Ark. 1972) (Fogelman, J., concurring);
State ex rel. Superior Court v. Sperry, 79 Wash. 2d 69, 78-79, 483 P.2d 608, 614 (Rossellini, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
18412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
"'The act of contempt partakes as muchof criticism of the court as it does of interfering with
a fair trial. See notes 132-33 and accompanying text supra. The statements might interfere with a
fair trial, but the prejudice would appear to be to Tijerina himself rather than the prosecution.
Nevertheless, the contempt was treated as silence order contempt.
"'The arguments were that the meeting was not public, that there was an unreasonable search,
that certain other evidence was inadmissible, and that the contemnors did not violate the order.
412 F.2d at 663-66.
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and sixth amendments, the court stated that it could decline review:
"When a court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and person, its
orders must be obeyed until reversed for error by orderly review.' 9 2 The
court continued, "this should dispose of the matter, but the circumstan-
ces of the case are such that the constitutional claims merit discus-
sion",13 and it proceeded to deal with and subsequently dismiss the
defendants' claims. Contempt was affirmed."4
Resort to the collateral bar rule may have been justified by some
of the circumstances of the case. The contemnors were defendants in the
criminal case. They were given notice and a hearing, and they neither
objected to the order nor asked that the convention be excepted from
its coverage.9 5 The order was apparently served. Four days expired
between the entry of the order and the convention. During this period,
the defendants could have objected, or an appeal could have been
mounted. Moreover, Tijerina was not a case in which contempt was
affirmed for breach of an invalid order because the appellate court did
discuss the merits of the order and dismissed the contemnors' argu-
ments. Even so, the opinion leaves to speculation whether the discussion
of the constitutionality of the order is dicta because the collateral bar
rule precluded considering it on the merits. If the order had been uncon-
stitutional, would the court have interposed the collateral bar rule to
justify affirming contempt without ruling on the merits of the order?
The use of the collateral bar rule in Tijerina seemingly to preclude
considering the constitutionality of the silence order has been criticized.
Dobbs notes that the contempt involved the exercise of "primary consti-
tutional rights" which might call for "special rules or procedures to
avoid any limit on free speech that is not absolutely necessary."'' 0 He
observes that "it is difficult to imagine the court upholding a contempt
sentence where the only act of contempt was the violation of a constitu-
tionally forbidden ex parte order." ' Dobbs concludes that a distinct
possibility exists that "a contempt charge based on violation of a court's
silencing order will be upheld only if the order itself is valid."' 99
In 1972, the Fifth Circuit was presented with an opportunity to
11412 F.2d at 666.
1931d.
"'The criminal conviction was also affirmed. United States v. Tijerina, 407 F.2d 349 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969).
"'Dobbs, supra note 49, at 217-18.
"'Id. at 217.
271d.
"d.
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resolve some of the questions left open by Tijerina.199 One Stewart, a
civil rights worker in Baton Rouge, was indicted by Louisiana officials
for conspiracy to murder the mayor. Stewart sought, in federal court,
to enjoin the conspiracy prosecution. The district court declined to join
the prosecution but, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit remanded the action
for an evidentiary hearing. Again the district court refused to enjoin the
prosecution, and again on appeal the Fifth Circuit ordered an eviden-
tiary hearing. At the second hearing in district court, Judge West,
speaking from the bench, stated that "there shall be no reporting of the
details of the evidence taken in this court today or in any continuation
of this trial." ' Dickinson and Adams, reporters for local papers, who
knew of the order, wrote newspaper articles which summarized the
evidence taken. The reporters were convicted of contempt and appealed.
Several factors in Dickinson contrast with Tijerina. In Dickinson,
the contemnors were not parties to the criminal proceeding. Moreover,
the silence order was apparently issued sua sponte. Notice was not given
that an order was forthcoming; a hearing was not held; and Dickinson
and Adams lacked an opportunity to object through counsel. Since the
order forbade disseminating the testimony that very day, the reporters
did not have four days to seek modification or clarification. Finally,
while the order in Tijerina was not found unconstitutional, the contrary
was found of the order in Dickinson. In the words of the court of
appeals, "a blanket ban on publication of Court proceedings, so far
transgresses First Amendment freedoms that it 'cannot withstand the
mildest breeze emanating from the Constitution.' "201 For these reasons,
then, Dickinson would appear to be a propitious case to dispense with
the collateral bar rule. The court of appeals, in an opinion by Chief
Judge Brown, nevertheless, applied the collateral bar rule holding that
a contemnor may not "knowingly violate an order which turns out to
be invalid." '
"'United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1972).
20Id. at 500. Although the silence order is criticized below, the reader should bear Judge
West's dilemma in mind. The hearing concerned whether to enjoin the state prosecution. Judge
West had to consider the effect of publicity on Stewart's trial should the state prosecution not be
enjoined. Much of the evidence would be the same. Judge West could not change the venue of the
state criminal trial. See also Wood v. Goodson, 485 S.W.2d 213 (Ark. 1972); Younger v. Smith,
30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 153-54, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239-40 (1973).
2114 65 F.2d at 500.
"'Id. at 509. The court did vacate the conviction because it was based on the mistaken
conclusion by the district court judge, Judge West, that the order was authorized. The case was
remanded to the district court to determine "[w]hether the judgment of contempt or the punish-
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The Dickinson opinion is closely articulated, and the reasons for
employing the collateral bar rule to refuse to pass on the merits of the
order bear examination and criticism. The problems considered are
whether Judge West's silence order was an injunction, whether the
reporter-contemnors were parties, whether the reporters had a practical
remedy by orderly review, whether the collateral bar rule applies in
freedom of the press cases, whether the court should discard the collat-
eral bar rule because the order was obviously invalid, and whether the
order was adjudicative rather than legislative.
Judge Brown states the collateral bar rule as "the well established
principle in proceedings for criminal contempt that an injunction duly
issuing out of a court having subject matter and personal jurisdiction
must be obeyed, irrespective of the ultimate validity of the order. Inval-
idity is no defense to criminal contempt." '203 Judge Brown provides two
reasons. The first reason is the need to follow an orderly, institutional
process to resolve disputes, and the second reason is the need to preserve
respect for courts and judicial orders.2 14
The first question considered is whether this silence order was an
injunction. In short, it is doubtful whether Judge West's order was an
injunction because, although prohibiting conduct, the order was ancil-
lary to the ultimate issues in the underlying action and did not grant the
ultimate relief sought.205 Clearly, since silence orders are not appealable
as injunctions, they should not be considered injunctions for the purpose
of calling forth the collateral bar rule and attentuating the ambit of
appellate inquiry.
Next, the question of whether these reporters were parties must be
examined. This question has been dealt with previously with the conclu-
ment therefor would still be deemed appropriate in light of the fact that the order disobeyed was
constitutionally infirm." Id. at 514. Judge West declined the implicit invitation to dismiss the
charges stating:
At the time of the contempt citation, it was not the validity vel non of the Court's order
that was primarily at issue. It was the intentional, willful, flagrant and contemptuous
disregard of the Court's order before in any way attempting to have the order, which
was obviously issued in good faith, judicially reviewed. It was upon this action, rather
than a mistake of law, that the contempt citation was bottomed.
United States v. Dickinson, 349 F. Supp. 227, 229 (M.D. La. 1972). The convictions and fines were
unchanged. Id. The contemnors again appealed to the Fifth Circuit arguing free press-fair trial
issues. The court refused to reexamine the issues holding that the earlier appeal was the law of the
case and affirmed the fines. United States v. Dickinson, 476 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
2465 F.2d at 509.
2'1d.
Z0See notes 34-54, 158-59 and accompanying text supra; 9 MooRE 1 110.20[1], at 233.
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sion that media representatives are "parties" to a silence order only in
the circular and self-fulfilling sense that they may be held in contempt
if they violate it.2"' Judge Brown observes that there is "no problem"
finding personal jurisdiction or jurisdiction of the court: "the District
Court certainly has power to formulate Free Press-Fair Trial orders in
cases pending before the court and to enforce those orders against all
who have actual and admitted knowledge of its prohibitions. '" ' 07 Thus,
the court has personal jurisdiction, and the reporters are parties because
the court says so. On the other hand, the reporters were not styled as
parties, the formalities of service of process were not accorded them,
and apparently they did not have an opportunity to object through
counsel. The practical protections of the adversary system and the adju-
dicative process were absent. As one of the reasons for finding the order
itself invalid, Judge Brown stated:
[W]hile the Court's power over particular conduct committed in
his presence within the courtroom is unquestioned, the injunction chal-
lenged in this case was not directed at any named party or court official
involved in the underlying litigation, but rather it sought to control
activities of non-parties to the lawsuit-namely, two reporters-in
matters not going to the merits of the substantive issues of the ongoing
trial or the court's ability to effectuate any ultimate judgment on
them .211
Thus, the reporters were not parties for the purpose of invalidating the
order but were parties for the purpose of imposing the collateral bar rule
and contempt.
In Walter v. Birmingham, the Supreme Court in dictum qualified
the application of the collateral bar rule by requiring that adequate and
effective remedies for review be present before the rule can be properly
invoked.209 If a practical opportunity to challenge an order is not avail-
able, then, by inference, a defendant could disobey the order and chal-
lenge it on the merits in his appeal of contempt.210 The silence order in
Dickinson was pronounced from the bench in the morning and was
ignored when the newspaper reporters met their deadline for the next
day's papers, probably within a matter of hours. The reporters did not
make an effort to challenge, modify or appeal the order between the
"'See notes 165-71 and accompanying text supra.
=465 F.2d at 511-12.
1Id. at 508.
-2388 U.S. 307, 318 (1967).
21465 F.2d at 511.
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time Judge West issued it and when they published. 1 Judge Brown
observed that "[t]imeliness of publication is the hallmark of 'news' and
the difference between 'news' and 'history' is merely a matter of hours,"
but stated that "newsmen are citizens too . . . .They too may some-
times have to wait. ' 212 Judge Brown stated further that whether the
collateral bar rule comes into play depends on "the immediate accessi-
bility of orderly review." In Dickinson "both the District Court and the
Court of Appeals were available and could have been contacted that
very day. ' 213 Judge Brown, accordingly, held that the contemnors had
access to orderly review and that the collateral bar rule applied.
The procedural problems involved in attaining effective direct re-
view of a silence order have been treated above.24 Nevertheless the
particular practical problems in the Dickinson case should be men-
tioned. The reporters rather than remaining at the hearing would have
had to retain an attorney, assist him in drafting documents and either
interrupt the Stewart hearing in progress to object to the silence order
or travel to the court of appeals in New Orleans or the nearest circuit
judge. The view taken in Dickinson is perilously close to requiring that
the reporters abandon their right to observe and report the hearing in
the process of suing to vindicate that right. Normally the appellate
process takes weeks and perhaps months rather than hours, and success
could not be predicted. But when constitutional rights are at issue as
they were in Dickinson and when the question is close, as it was in
Dickinson, the court should not take refuge in merit avoidance devices
like the collateral bar rule.21
The contemnors argued, in favor of dispensing with the collateral
bar rule, that the rule does not "apply to injunctions or other judicial
orders infringing freedom of the press '216 as distinguished from other
constitutional freedoms which are subsumed with non-constitutional
1"Id. at 512 n.18; cf In re Green, 369 U.S. 689 (1962). In Green the contemnor made a motion
to vacate the challenged order before violating it and, in contempt, the merits of the order were
considered. Green was distinguished for that reason in Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315
n.6 (1967).
212465 F.2d at 512. This was the position of the dissenters in New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713, 748-52 (Burger, C.J.), 752-59 (Harlan, J.), 759-63 (Blackmun, J.) (1971).
But cf. Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 261 Cal. App. 2d 505, -, 68 Cal. Rptr. 83,
95-96 (1968).
21465 F.2d at 512.
" See notes 8-119 and accompanying text supra.
"'See Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 344-45 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2"'465 F.2d at 511.
[Vol. 52
REVIEW OF SILENCE ORDERS
error into the rule.217 Judge Brown rejected this distinction by relating
the mode of expression to the timeliness factor in the timely challenge
requirement.2 1 1
New York Times Co. v. United States,2 19 in which the Supreme
Court affirmed the right of a newspaper to publish, was also cited by
Judge Brown as support for resort to the collateral bar rule. Judge
Brown noted that the separate opinions in New York Times Co. did not
suggest "that the injunctions could have been ignored with impunity"
and concluded that "an assumption that courts may punish as contempt
violations of even its constitutionally defective orders infringing free-
dom of the press underlies the Times decision. ' 2 1 Judge Brown is clearly
correct on that point. The distinction between erroneous and void orders
should not be obscured by the additional distinction that some errors
are sufficiently serious that they may be treated as if they were void.
The problem, however, relates not to the magnitude of the asserted error
but rather to the practical problem of whether the timely challenge
requirement was read so narrowly as to destroy its usefulness. The
practicalities of challenge should be considered rather than legalism and
possibilities. The contemnors in Dickinson had an abstract rather than
a practical opportunity to challenge the silence order before publishing.
The collateral bar rule should, therefore, not be interposed to prevent a
challenge to the order after publication.
Judge Brown mentioned but did not discuss another of the qualifi-
cations placed on the collateral bar rule in Walker v. Birmingham. In
explaining why the Alabama courts could have recourse to the collateral
bar rule in Walker, the Supreme Court said, "this is not a case where
2
'See note 145 supra. Walker v. Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), involved picketing. The
argument that the collateral bar rule does not apply to prior restraints would fail because the more
prior the restraint is, the more time there is for a timely challenge. See notes 209-13 and accompa-
nying text supra. The collateral bar rule would not apply in a contemporaneous prior restraint (if
there is such a thing), however, because there would be no time for a timely challenge. Cf. United
States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 511 (5th Cir. 1972).
"Of course the nature of the expression sought to be exercised is a factor to be
considered in determining whether First Amendment rights can be effectively protected
by orderly review so as to render disobedience to otherwise unconstitutonal mandates
nevertheless contemptuous. But newsmen are citizens, too. They too may sometimes
have to wait. They are not yet wrapped in an immunity or given the absolute right to
decide with impunity whether a judge's order is to be obeyed or whether an appellate
court is acting promptly enough.
465 F.2d at 512 (cite omitted).
219403 U.S. 713 (1971).
22465 F.2d at 511.
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the injunction was transparently invalid or had only a frivolous pretense
to validity" because of the local government's interest in traffic con-
trol.221 It may be inferred from this statement that a frivolous or trans-
parently invalid injunction may be disobeyed, and upon a charge of
contempt, frivolousness or transparent invalidity may be shown to hur-
dle the barrier posed by the collateral bar rule and to reach a hearing
on the merits of the injunction or order. 2 The frivolousness exception
has never been expanded nor explained, and Blasi says, "[ilt is still
unclear whether this language represents merely a makeweight argu-
ment or a careful delineation of doctrine." ' 3 Nevertheless, Judge
West's silence order was a frivolous and transparently invalid one. The
court of appeals states that "no decision, opinion, report or other au-
thoritative proposal has ever sanctioned by holding, hint, dictum, rec-
ommendation or otherwise any judicial prohibition of the right of the
press to publish accurately reports of proceedings which transpire in
open court." ' 4 Thus, had Judge Brown followed the logic of the trans-
parent invalidity exception which he cites, 25 contempt would have been
reversed along with the order on which it was based.
In order to justify the collateral bar rule, injunctions should be
distinguished from other governmental directives. A citizen may violate
most unlawful exercises of government power but must, at the price of
contempt, obey illegal, even unconstitutional injunctions. 21 Judge
Brown's response to this apparent anomoly is in the best creative tradi-
tion. He begins by pointing out the "uniqueness" of judicial orders as
compared to legislative, executive and administrative directives. The
difference in scope of review is "not the product of self-protection or
arrogance of Judges. ' '221 According to Judge Brown, breach of executive
and legislative directives is passed to the courts where the final responsi-
bility for enforcement lies. Disobedience of a statute or executive order
does not prevent those bodies from discharging their duties to pass upon
and execute public policy because the court system deals with the recu-
sant. Defiance of court orders, in contrast, "requires further action by
the judiciary, and therefore directly affects the judiciary's ability to
2213 8 8 U.S. at 315.
22Note, Constitutional law: The First Amendment and the Right to Violate an Injunction, 56
CALIF. L. REV. 517, 521 (1968).
mBlasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1481, 1561 (1968).
121465 F.2d at 507.
2id. at 509.22See generally Note, Defiance of Unlawful Authority, 83 HARV. L. REv. 626 (1970).
22465 F.2d at 510.
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discharge its duties and responsibilities. ' 28 Therefore, it is appropriate
to require a citizen to test an injunction by orderly review rather than
by ignoring it. Contempt power and the collateral bar rule are, by this
reasoning, essential for the courts to carry out their duties under separa-
tion of powers.22 1
Judge Brown's reasoning in incisive and original. Nevertheless, the
collateral bar rule is not applied to breach of all judicial orders. Due
process requires that the courts expunge contempt for breach of an
injunction which was granted without personal or subject matter juris-
diction.23 1 Moreover, a decree of civil contempt rests upon the underly-
ing order and falls with it.21t Discovery sanctions under the federal rules
apparently are treated in the same way.232 One simple fact cannot be
concealed. The collateral bar rule, although based on significant and
respectable policies, is a merit avoidance technique devised by judges for
the discipline of litigants and others.
CONCLUSION
This article has analyzed the media's problems in securing review
of a silence order. They are imposing. The source of many of the diffi-
culties in this study is easy to discern. It is the conflict between the ideals
of the substantive standard and the procedural realities of enforcing
them. The difficulty, in short, is a tyranny of labels. Review of silence
orders is an exceptional problem which strains accepted terminology
and analysis. It does not fit into a procedural framework which was
designed with other things in mind. When analysis is trapped in a con-
ventional conceptual framework, discussion of the issues is obscured by
ngJd.
tm ld. at 510. But cf. Younger v. Smith, 30 Cal. App. 3d 138, 106 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1973).
2See notes 142-43 and accompanying text, supra.
2'United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 294-95 (1947). Judge Brown gives as an exception
to the collateral bar rule breach of an order which requires "an irretrievable surrender of constitu-
tional guarantees." The cases cited are civil contempt cases in which the order was coercive rather
than punitive. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
2Under the present rule the court is to decide whether "opposition to the motion was
substantially justified." FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4), Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); cf. C.
WRIGHT, supra note 12, § 16 at 52 n.17, § 90, at 398; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTIcE AND PROCEDURE § 2006 n.85 (1970). But see Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119,
rehearing denied, 408 F.2d 348, 349-50 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, C.J., dissenting) (criminal contempt
and appeallable yet discovery order examined on the merits). Clarity would be served if it were
recognized that discovery sanctions are in a separate class for the purposes of appealability and
scope of review. Cf. 4 MOORE 26.83[8]; 9 MOORE 110.13[2], [4].
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the opaque fog of an almost inapplicable terminology. Understanding
of the underlying interests and policies is hampered.
The current procedural framework is not inadequate to secure re-
view of silence orders. Workable mechanisms are available to enforce
the commands of the substantive law. The extraordinary writs provide,
almost everywhere, a potential safety valve for speedy review. The Flor-
ida court has pointed the way2 3 and others would do well to follow.
If the media disdains to challenge the silence order but instead
ignores it, the merits of the order should, nevertheless, be reviewed in
contempt. The interests are too basic and the problem too general to
require the media to choose between abandoning a constitutional right
and being punished for exercising it. The need for objective, institution-
alized judgment and authoritative standards for lower courts are also
weighty reasons to review the constitutionality of the silence order. If,
moreover, the collateral bar rule is rejected in silence order contempts,
it should be rejected because the silence order does not match the requir-
ments for the rule rather than because an erroneous silence order is
unconstitutional and void.234
Procedure is an important instrument, but it is an instrument and
nothing more. Procedure has been repeatedly remade and is being re-
made now. The only sound test of procedure is its practical effect in
allowing the legal process to reach decisions on the merits. When deci-
sions on the merits are prevented by failure to consider all affected
interests, lack of convenient access to a neutral forum or refusal to reach
the essential justice of a cause, complacent dogmatism has replaced
thoughtful analysis. It is especially disheartening when the means for the
task are at hand but, because inapplicable dogmas are inflexibly applied,
they have not been brought into play. This modest effort has, it is hoped,
suggested methods which will allow all interests to be conveniently con-
sidered and ensure that all cases in this narrow area are decided on their
merits.
23'See notes 77-79 supra.
2See notes 182-88 supra.
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